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CIVIL LIABILITY REFORM GONE TOO 
FAR? 
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[This paper focuses on two recent appeals1 before the High Court of Australia 
involving negligence actions for damages by intoxicated plaintiffs.  The 
analysis of these pre-statutory reform cases, in the light of the new civil 
liability legislation, suggests that some of the statutory reforms are an 
overreaction by parliaments, and fail to strike a balance between, on the one 
hand, the legitimate pursuit of compensation where the defendant’s 
blameworthy conduct has caused damage and on the other, the limitation of 
negligence litigation by an attitudinal change towards personal responsibility  
for one’s actions and choices, thereby shifting the loss to the victim where the 
latter’s conduct has been instrumental in causing its own damage.] 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
The impetus for widespread civil liability reform in Australia had its genesis 
in the increased volume of tort litigation for negligence and large damage 
awards.  Underpinning the volume of this litigation were factors such as 
speculative actions by lawyers; an increased awareness by the public through 
media coverage of their rights to sue for negligence; and potentially large 
damage awards.  Furthermore, courts had opened the door to claims, not just 
for personal injury or property damage, but also for purely financial loss (eg, 
negligent financial advice causing economic loss).  A greater awareness in the 
community of a right to sue for negligence had led to class actions for mass 
torts such as environmental pollutants, defective products, etc.  The result of 
this litigation was an unworkable increase in premiums for liability insurance 
and/or the withdrawal of insurers from this area altogether. The  reaction of 
the insurance industry was motivated in part by actuarial evidence of potential 
risk.  Consequently, Governments and courts reacted to an ever-increasing 
burden placed on the community, with the former (governments, State and 
Federal) implementing statutory reforms limiting the scope of civil liability. 
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1 Joslyn v Berryman: Wentworth Shire Council v Berryman (2002) 214 CLR 552; 
Cole v South Tweed Heads Rugby League Football Club Ltd (2004) 207 ALR 52. 
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It is suggested in this paper that some of the statutory initiatives are the result 
of an overreaction by governments and that  in some instances, the provisions 
lack fairness and balance resulting in unjust outcomes, and the denial of a 
legitimate right of recovery for negligently inflicted damage or injury. 
 
This paper focuses particularly on those statutory provisions dealing with 
intoxication and their effect on civil liability.   
 
Do the provisions relating to intoxication strike a fair balance between the 
rights and obligations of plaintiff victims and negligent defendants?  To 
answer this question, an analysis of two High Court of Australia appeals, 
Joslyn v Berryman: Wentworth Shire Council v Berryman (‘Joslyn’)2 and 
Cole v. South Tweed Heads Rugby League Football Club Limited (‘Cole’)3 
will be undertaken.  These cases predated the civil liability reform legislation, 
but it is proposed to examine them in the light of the new legislation, and to 
assess the potential effect and outcome had they been decided under the 
relevant statutory provisions. 
 
II JOSLYN V BERRYMAN: WENTWORTH SHIRE COUNCIL V 
BERRYMAN 
 
McHugh J recited the facts and issues in Joslyn as follows: 
 
When Sally Inch Joslyn (appellant) noticed that the first respondent, Allen 
Troy Berryman, was falling asleep at the wheel of the vehicle that they were 
travelling in, she insisted that she drive the vehicle.  Shortly after Ms Joslyn 
commenced to drive, the vehicle overturned causing injury to Berryman.  
The accident occurred about 8.45 a.m.  The driving capacity of both parties 
was affected by their intoxication.  They had been drinking at a party until 
about 4.00 a.m.  The vehicle also had a propensity to roll over, and its 
speedometer was broken.  The respondent (Berryman) having suffered 
severe injuries in the accident sued the driver, Sally Inch Joslyn, and the 
Wentworth Shire Council for damages in the District Court of New South 
Wales, claiming that Ms Joslyn had driven negligently and that the Council 
was negligent in failing to provide proper warning signs.  The action was 
heard by Boyd-Boland ADCJ.  His Honour found Ms Joslyn guilty of 
negligence.  He also found that the Council was guilty of negligence in not 
erecting a sign that adequately warned of the danger of the curve where the 
accident occurred.  He held Ms Joslyn 90 % and the Council 10 % 
responsible for the accident.  However, His Honour reduced the damages by  
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25 % because of the contributory negligence of Mr Berryman in allowing Ms 
Joslyn to drive when he ought to have been aware that she was unfit to drive.  
Mr Berryman appealed to the Court of Appeal of New South Wales 
contending that the trial judged erred in finding that he was guilty of 
contributory negligence.  Alternatively, he contended that the trial judge 
should have found a smaller percentage of contributory negligence.  Ms 
Joslyn and the Council cross appealed against the percentage of contributory 
negligence attributed to Mr Berryman.  They contended that the trial judge 
should have made a finding of up to 80 % contributory negligence.  The 
Court of Appeal (Priestly JA, Meagher JA and Ipp AJA) allowed Mr 
Berryman’s appeal, holding that he was not guilty of contributory 
negligence. 4: 
 
Section 74(2) of the Motor Accident Act 1988 (NSW) requires a finding of 
contributory negligence if an injured person was “a voluntary passenger in a 
motor vehicle” and “was aware, or ought to have been aware that the driver’s 
ability to drive was impaired by alcohol.” 
 
The issues on appeal to the High Court of Australia were: 
 
(1) Whether Mr Berryman was guilty of contributory negligence at 
common law; 
(2) Whether Mr Berryman was aware, or ought to have been aware, 
that Ms Joslyn was incapacitated by reason of her intoxication; 
(3) Whether, in determining for the purposes of section 74(2) that a 
passenger was or ought to have been aware that the driver’s 
ability was impaired by alcohol, regard could be had to facts and 
circumstances occurring before the passenger entered the vehicle. 
 
By a majority, the High Court of Australia allowed the appeals and found that 
Mr Berryman was guilty of contributory negligence at common law and by 
reason of the direction in s 74 of the Motor Accident Act 1988 (NSW) 
independently of the common law.  He was guilty of contributory negligence 
at common law because a reasonable person in his position would have 
known that Ms Joslyn was affected by alcohol by reason of her drinking 
during the previous 12 hours, that the vehicle was defective and that, by 
becoming a passenger he was exposing himself to the risk of injury.  He was 
guilty of contributory negligence also by reason of the direction in s 74 since 
he was a voluntary passenger and ought to have been aware that Ms Jolsyn’s 
ability to drive was impaired by alcohol. 
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A Relevant Provisions Under Civil Liability Legislation 
 
The relevant section in New South Wales under the Civil Liability Act 2002 
(NSW) is s 50 set out hereunder: 
 
50 No Recovery where person intoxicated 
 
(1) This section applies when it is established that the person whose 
death, injury or damage is the subject of proceedings for the 
recovery of damages was at the time of the act or omission that 
caused the death, injury or damage intoxicated to the extent that 
the person’s capacity to exercise reasonable care and skill was 
impaired.   
 
(2) A court is not to award damages in respect of liability to which 
this Part applies unless satisfied that the death, injury or damage 
to property (or some other injury or damage to property) is likely 
to have occurred even if the person had not been intoxicated. 
 
(3) If the court is satisfied that the death, injury or damage to 
property (or some other injury or damage to property) is likely to 
have occurred even if the person had not been intoxicated, it is to 
be presumed that the person was contributorily negligent unless 
the court is satisfied that the person’s intoxication did not 
contribute in anyway to the cause of the death, injury or damage. 
 
(4) When there is a presumption of contributory negligence, the court 
must assess damages on the basis that the damages to which the 
person would be entitled in the absence of contributory 
negligence are to be reduced on account of contributory 
negligence by 25 % or a greater percentage determined by the 
court to be appropriate in the circumstances of the case. 
 
(5) This section does not apply in a case where the court is satisfied 
that the intoxication was not self-induced.   
 
It is suggested that had Joslyn been determined under s 50 the court would 
have been disabled and prohibited from awarding any damages to the plaintiff 
(Mr Berryman).  The effect of s 50 (2) is to prevent the recovery of damages 
by an intoxicated plaintiff unless the court can be satisfied that the injury and 
subsequent damage to the plaintiff was likely to have occurred even if the 
plaintiff had not been intoxicated.  The facts in Joslyn suggest that had the 
plaintiff not been intoxicated he would not have relinquished the driving 
position to his intoxicated female companion and the accident and subsequent  
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injuries would not have occurred.  There is nothing in the evidence to suggest 
that the plaintiff, had he not been affected by alcohol, would have had reason 
to give over the driving to an intoxicated passenger or that any accident would 
have occurred.  Consequently, the plaintiff would not have recovered any 
damages whatsoever under the New South Wales reform legislation. 
 
It is interesting to compare this outcome with the findings in the case under 
the existing common law.  It is also instructive to analyse the likely outcome 
in Joslyn had the case been decided under civil liability legislation in other 
States. 
 
B Findings Under Existing Common Law Principles 
 
As noted above, at the trial of this action the court found the defendant driver 
(Joslyn) 90 % responsible for the accident and the local authority, 10 % 
responsible, but reduced the damages to be awarded to the plaintiff by 25 % 
because of the plaintiff’s contributory negligence in allowing Ms Joslyn to 
drive, when he ought to have been aware that she was unfit to drive. 
 
The principles relating to contributory negligence were concisely stated by 
McHugh J: 
 
At common law, a plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence when the 
plaintiff exposes himself or herself to a risk of injury which might 
reasonably have been foreseen and avoided and suffers an injury within the 
class of risk to which the plaintiff was exposed.  In principle, any fact or 
circumstance is relevant in determining contributory negligence if it proves, 
or assists in proving, a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury to the plaintiff in 
engaging in the conduct that gave rise to the injury suffered.5 
 
McHugh J concluded that: 
 
A plaintiff cannot escape a finding of contributory negligence by pleading 
ignorance of facts that a reasonable person would have known or 
ascertained.  Contributory negligence is independent of the idiosyncrasies of 
the particular person whose conduct is in question.  Similarly, the fact that 
the passenger’s intoxicated condition prevents him or her from perceiving 
the risks attendant on driving with an intoxicated driver does not absolve the 
passenger from complying with the standard of care required of an ordinary 
reasonable person.6 
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The drastic effect of s 50 under the New South Wales civil liability reforms is 
apparent in Joslyn.  A plaintiff, who may have recovered damages of perhaps 
some millions of dollars under common law, even despite the reduction for 
contributory negligence, will recover nothing under s 50.  The practical effect 
of s 50, as Joslyn indicates, is substantial, and represents a major policy shift 
with respect to intoxication.  Whether the policy underpinning s 50 is 
justified, and whether the drafting of s 50 is an appropriate response to the 
underlying policy will be discussed later in this paper. 
 
C Other State Civil Liability Legislation 
 
A less severe approach to the intoxicated plaintiff has been adopted in the 
other States in their civil liability legislation.  Generally the approach of other 
States7 is to reduce the damages to be awarded to the plaintiff, due to the 
plaintiff’s intoxication, but not to deny any recovery whatsoever as in New 
South Wales.  The legislation in other States raises a presumption of 
contributory negligence unless the plaintiff can establish that its intoxication 
did not contribute in any way to their harm.  The relevant Queensland 
provisions deserve special attention since, not only do they embody this less 
stringent approach to the intoxicated plaintiff, but additionally, they are 
prescriptive as to the percentage of the plaintiff’s contributory negligence.   
 
The relevant provisions in Queensland are set out below: 
 
47 Presumption of contributory negligence if person who suffers harm is 
intoxicated 
 
(1) This section applies if a person who suffered harm was intoxicated 
at the time of the breach of duty giving rise to a claim for damages 
and contributory negligence is alleged by the defendant. 
 
(2) Contributory negligence will, subject to this section, be presumed 
 
 
(3) The person may only rebut the presumption by establishing on the 
balance of probabilities: 
(a) that the intoxication did not contribute to the breach of 
duty; or 
(b) that the intoxication was not self-induced. 
 
 
                                                 
7 See, eg, Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) ss 46,47,48; Civil Liability Act  2002 (WA) s 
5L; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) ss 46,47,48,49 
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(4) Unless the person rebuts the presumption of contributory 
negligence, the court must assess damages on the basis that the 
damages to which the person would be entitled in the absence of 
contributory negligence are to be reduced, on account of 
contributory negligence, by 25% or a greater percentage decided by 
the court to be appropriate in the circumstances of the case. 
 
(5) If, in the case of a motor vehicle accident, the person who suffered 
harm was the driver of a motor vehicle involved in the accident and 
the evidence establishes 
 
(a) that the concentration of alcohol in the driver’s blood was 
150mg or more of alcohol in 100ml of blood; or 
 
(b)  that the driver was so much under the influence of 
 alcohol or a drug as to be incapable of exercising 
 effective control of the vehicle; 
 
the minimum reduction prescribed by subsection (4) is increased to 50%. 
 
48 Presumption of contributory negligence if person who suffers harm 
relies on care and skill of person known to be intoxicated 
 
(1) This section applies to a person who suffered harm (“plaintiff”) 
who: 
 
(a) was at least 16 years at the time of the breach of duty 
giving rise to the harm; and 
(b) relied on the car and skill of a person who was intoxicated 
at the time of the breach of duty (“defendant”); and 
(c) was aware, or ought reasonably to have been aware, that 
the defendant was intoxicated. 
 
(2) If the harm suffered by the plaintiff was caused through the 
negligence of the defendant and the defendant alleges contributory 
negligence on the part of the plaintiff, contributory negligence will, 
subject to this section, be presumed. 
 
(3) The plaintiff may only rebut the presumption if the plaintiff 
establishes, on the balance of probabilities, that: 
 
(a) the defendant’s intoxication did not contribute to the 
breach of duty; or 
(b) the plaintiff could not reasonably be expected to have 
avoided relying on the defendant’s care and skill. 
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(4) Unless the plaintiff rebuts the presumption of contributory 
negligence, the court must assess damages on the basis that the 
damages to which the plaintiff would be entitled in the absence of 
contributory negligence are to be reduced, on account of 
contributory negligence, by 25% or a greater percentage decided by 
the court to be appropriate in the circumstances of the case. 
 
(5) The common law defence of voluntary assumption of risk does not 
apply to a matter to which this section applies. 
 
 49  Additional presumption for motor vehicle accident 
 
(1) This section applies to a plaintiff and defendant mentioned in 
section 48. 
 
(2) If: 
 
(a) the breach of duty giving rise to the harm suffered by the 
plaintiff was a motor vehicle accident; and 
(b) the plaintiff was a passenger in the motor vehicle; and 
(c) the motor vehicle was driven by the defendant; and 
 (d) either: 
  (i) the concentration of alcohol in the defendant’s 
  blood was 150mg or more of alcohol in 100ml of 
  blood; or 
  (ii) the defendant was so much under the influence of 
  alcohol or a drug as to be incapable of exercising 
  effective control of the vehicle; 
  the minimum reduction prescribed by section 49(4) is increased to 
 50%. 
 
(3) The plaintiff is taken, for this section, to rely on the care and skill of 
the defendant. 
 
To emphasise the policy choice in Queensland that intoxicated plaintiffs are 
not prohibited from recovering some damage, s 48 specifies that the common 
law defence of voluntary assumption of risk is not available.8  However, the 
legislation raises a presumption of a minimum 25% contributory negligence9 
or in the case of a motor vehicle, the minimum reduction in the damages to be 
awarded to the plaintiff is 50%10.   
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9 s 48 (4. 
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If Joslyn’s case had been decided under the Queensland provisions, the 
plaintiff would not have been denied recovery, but would have had the award 
of damages reduced by at least 50%.  The suggestion in this paper (discussed 
below) is that the policy choice reflected in the Queensland provisions is fair 
and strikes a balance between recognition of personal responsibility for one’s 
actions (self-induced intoxication), and a right to recover some compensation 
where another’s fault has caused harm to the plaintiff.  This balance is lacking 
in the New South Wales legislation. 
 
III COLE V SOUTH TWEED HEADS RUGBY LEAGUE FOOTBALL CLUB 
LIMITED 
 
The facts and issues in Cole were concisely stated by Gleeson CJ: 
 
The appellant (Mrs Cole) was injured as a result of being run down by a 
motor car on a public road.  The driver of the motor car was also sued, but 
she is not involved in the present appeal.  The respondent (South Tweed 
Heads Rugby League Football Club Limited) had no connection with the 
motor car, or the driver.  The respondent’s alleged connection with the 
appellant’s injuries arose in the following manner.  At the time she was run 
down (about 6.20 p.m. on a Sunday evening), the appellant was walking in a 
careless manner along the roadway.  The motorist was unable to avoid her.  
The appellant’s explanation of her careless behaviour was that she was 
drunk.  The appellant had spent most of the day at or around the respondent’s 
licensed club.  The respondents supplied her with some, but not all, of the 
drinks she consumed.  The appellant blames the respondent for her presence 
on the road in an intoxicated state, and for her injuries. 
Two aspects of the conduct of the respondent are said to involve fault.  First 
it is said that the respondent supplied the appellant with drink at a time when 
a reasonable person would have known she was intoxicated.  Secondly, it is 
said that the respondent allowed the appellant to leave its premises in an 
unsafe condition, without proper and adequate assistance. 11 
 
The appeal in the High Court was dismissed.  A majority refused to recognise 
the existence of any general duty of care on clubs or more generally, suppliers 
of alcohol in a commercial setting, to monitor and moderate the amount of 
alcohol consumed by patrons.  There were strong dissenting judgments by 
McHugh J12 and Kirby J13 who found a duty owed and breached by the Club.  
The Chief Justice while denying any general duty of care on Clubs, referred to  
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the possibility that there may be circumstances in which a supplier of alcohol 
comes under a duty to take reasonable care to protect a particular person from 
the risk of physical injury resulting from self-induced intoxication.14 
 
At first instance in Cole before the Supreme Court of New South Wales, the 
trial judge found the plaintiff (appellant) 40% responsible for her own injury, 
the driver who struck her, 30% responsible, and the Club, 30% responsible.  
However, these findings of negligence against the driver and Club were 
reversed on appeal to the Court of Appeal of New South Wales.15 
 
 A  Section 50 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) and 
  its Effect on Cole 
 
While the application of s 50 in Cole’s case would not have resulted in any 
injustice, since the plaintiff failed to establish any negligence by the driver, or 
against the Club who supplied her with alcohol, it is interesting to speculate 
on the application of s 50 in a case where, despite the plaintiff’s intoxication, 
a driver has negligently struck the intoxicated pedestrian, or where, as referred 
to by Gleeson CJ, there are special circumstances in which the supplier of 
alcohol does owe a duty of care to protect a particular person from physical 
injury.   
 
The irony under s 50(2) in New South Wales, is that if the court is not 
satisfied that the event (eg, being struck on the road by a negligent driver) 
which caused the intoxicated plaintiff’s injuries was  likely to have occurred 
even if the plaintiff was sober, then the very party who may have negligently 
breached a duty of care to prevent that intoxication (the supplier of alcohol to 
the plaintiff) will be immune from any claim for damages with respect to the 
intoxicated plaintiff.  Further, the negligent driver who could have avoided the 
intoxicated pedestrian and prevented any injury, will also be protected from 
any claim for damages.   
 
IV  THE POLICY CHOICES 
 
It is suggested that the policy choice in New South Wales, reflected in the 
drafting of s 50(2), essentially returns the law to the middle of the 20th century 
when the contributory negligence of a plaintiff was a complete defence to an 
action for negligence.  The fact that a plaintiff is disqualified from recovering  
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damage if he or she is intoxicated at the time of their injury and the event 
causing that plaintiff’s injuries is unlikely to have occurred if they were sober, 
effectively makes their contributory negligence (self-induced intoxication), a 
complete defence, thus resurrecting a rule which the common law had 
perceived as harsh and unjust.   
 
The common law had developed principles to avoid and circumvent the 
severity of the contributory negligence defence.  It required that the defendant 
carry the onus of proving contributory negligence by the plaintiff, rather than 
the plaintiff having to negative the plea.16  Further, the common law in the 
area of causation had developed the ‘last opportunity’ rule whereby, even if 
the plaintiff’s negligence had contributed to the accident in the sense of a 
causa sine qua non, the plaintiff could still recover if the defendant had the 
last opportunity to avoid the accident, and through its negligence was the 
effective or immediate cause (causa causans).17  
 
The harshness of the contributory negligence defence was also circumvented 
by the common law holding that contributory negligence was not a defence to 
an action for breach of statutory duty.18   
 
Even after the abandonment of the defence of contributory negligence and the 
advent of apportionment legislation, courts were reluctant to see a plaintiff 
barred from recovery against a negligent defendant by a successful defence of 
volenti non fit injuria.  This was evident in motor vehicle accidents, where the 
negligent defendant driver pleaded the defence of voluntary assumption of the 
risk against the injured passenger plaintiff.19  The common law made it almost 
impossible for the defence to succeed, by finding either, that the plaintiff did 
not fully appreciate the risk, or alternatively, had assumed the factual risk of 
harm but not the legal risk and thereby had not exonerated the defendant from 
responsibility for the tort of negligence.20   
 
The above devices of the common law were a reaction to the injustice of 
denying any recovery to a plaintiff whose negligence may have contributed to 
their own injuries, but where the defendant’s negligence was also a significant  
 
                                                 
16 Butterfield v Forrester (1809) 11 East 60; [103 ER 926]. 
17 Alford v Magee (1952) 85 CLR 437. 
18 Bourke v Butterfield & Lewis Ltd (1926) 38 CLR 354. 
19 Duncan v Bell & SGIO(Q) (1967) Qd R 425; Dodd v McGlashan [1967] ALR 433; 
O’Shea v Permanent Trustee Co of NSW Ltd [1971] Qd R 1; Banovic v Perkovic 
(1982) 30 SASR 34; Coan v Kirby and Redman (1979) 20 SASR 263. 
20 Ibid. 
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cause of the plaintiff’s harm. The courts have preferred to apportion blame in 
these circumstances by diminishing the damages awarded to the plaintiff 
rather than a blanket denial of recovery.   
 
Sections 48, 49 and 50 of the Queensland Civil Liability Act 2003 embody this 
preference of the common law.  The Queensland provisions, while 
recognising the responsibility of individuals for their own conduct and choices 
(eg, self-induced intoxication and the accompanying risks) also recognise the 
right of an individual (even if intoxicated) to recover damages against 
someone whose fault and blameworthy conduct has caused injury to the 
plaintiff.  This balance is not found in the New South Wales provisions.   
 
The policy underlying s 50(2) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) is to 
elevate the causa sine qua non (ie without the plaintiff’s intoxication there 
would not have been an accident) to the position of a complete defence, 
thereby ignoring the negligence of the defendant which may have been a 
significant causative factor in the plaintiff’s injuries and permitting such 
negligence to go with impunity. 
 
V CONCLUSION 
 
It is suggested that civil liability provisions such as s 50 of the Civil Liability 
Act 2002 (NSW) represent an overreaction to the need for civil liability 
reform.  While such provisions will achieve the stated aim of reducing 
litigation for negligence and shifting responsibility to the individual for their 
choices and actions, a provision such as s 50 may also work injustice by 
depriving seriously injured plaintiffs of any recovery of damage against a 
grossly negligent defendant whose conduct is both blameworthy and a 
significant causative factor in the plaintiff’s harm. 
 
 
